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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar†
We rely on agencies to increase air quality and mitigate climate change,
protect public health and safety, and safeguard the integrity of financial
markets. Nearly a century ago Max Weber cogently observed that the
modern nation-state depends on bureaucracy—or, in modern parlance, on
administrative agencies.1 He would not have been surprised to see how,
even as self-driving cars navigate the streets of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
and Mountain View, California, agencies staffed by bureaucrats and
overseen by administrators have remained the essential organizational
technology of the administrative state.2 Whether those agency
administrators exercise sufficient independent judgment as individuals to
warrant the integrity and accountability of a decision has, in turn, been the
subject of some classic administrative law cases.3
But technological change is creating new dilemmas and opportunities
for the administrative state. Agencies today can rely on sophisticated
computer programs—programs that agencies could use to make or support
decisions, and that could therefore assume an increasingly prominent role
in the regulatory process. The smartphones that so many Americans carry
around in their pockets are far more powerful—and an order of magnitude
cheaper—than the vast computers scientists and the military used a
generation ago. In the coming years, computing power and storage will
almost certainly become even cheaper, surveillance more pervasive,
software architecture more flexible, and the limitations of human decisionmakers will become more salient.
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Justice on the California Supreme Court and Visiting Professor at Stanford Law
School and Harvard Law School. This essay is an edited version of the author’s 2016
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1
MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1922), https://archive.org/stream/MaxWeber
EconomyAndSociety/MaxWeberEconomyAndSociety_djvu.txt.
2
Liz Reid, What It's Like to Ride in a (Nearly) Self-Driving Uber, NPR (Sept. 14,
2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/09/14/493823483/self-drivingcars-take-to-the-streets-of-pittsburgh-courtesy-of-uber.
3
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
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Traditional expert systems used law-like techniques to search through
potential options when analyzing how to diagnose certain medical
conditions, or how to categorize a particular kind of molecule—but they
were cumbersome at best when it came to some of the seemingly simplest
things that people could do almost “without thinking,” like classifying
visual objects, interpreting idiomatic expressions, or decoding nonverbal
communication. As computing power gets cheaper and software improves,
expert systems are ever more able to sift through millions of options quite
quickly. But an even bigger change is underway in the realm of so-called
“machine learning,” where the software architecture uses two interesting
techniques.
One technique involves so-called “neural networks,” which are inspired
by the layout of the human brain to spot patterns and leverage “big data.”
“Deep learning” systems embody a particular architecture for neural
networks that avoid some persistent problems neural networks have had in
developing adaptive responses to new data and have sparked particular
interest because of its capacity to solve pattern-recognition problems in
computer vision and other fields.
Meanwhile, “genetic algorithms” that emerge by developing simple
algorithms—or baby computer programs—to solve a problem like spotting
suspicious financial transactions, allowing those algorithms to mutate
slightly over time, and then selecting for the algorithms that beat the others
on a given metric. It is a great way to write a nearly security-proof, pesky
computer virus, which we will return to later in this series. But it is more
generally through machine learning that new progress is underway on many
of those apparently simple but devilishly hard technical problems, like
vision and speech recognition.
Because of these changes, lawyers for regulated industries, citizens
facing possible search or arrest from the police, and individuals seeking
asylum will find themselves interacting with agency officials who heavily
rely on software to make decisions—or perhaps these members of the public
will be interacting directly with the software itself. More extensive use of
programs designed to supplement—or even replace—human decisionmakers will become commonplace as computing power and memory
become cheaper, data from surveillance become more pervasive, and
economic and military pressures drive adoption. The public already relies
on software to recommend romantic partners and investments. As
autonomous and elaborate decision-support programs become more
common, social norms will continue to change about the propriety of
relying on computers to make decisions. Although computer programs
analyzing vast amounts of information may hold some promise for making
better use of data, enhancing transparency, and reducing inconsistency in
bureaucratic justice, such reliance may bring about subtle consequences and
deeper questions that merit careful scrutiny.
What should we make of a world where the entities entrusted to exercise
administrative power are not agencies but software programs that leverage
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the fast-developing technology of artificial intelligence? Imagine a series of
sleek black boxes—capable of sustaining a cogent conversation with an
expert, and networked to an elaborate structure of machines, data, and coded
instruction sets—that deliver bureaucratic justice. It could begin innocently
enough, with anodyne decision-support programs for administrative law
judges adjudicating disability claims, or for hearing examiners at the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. But as the interfaces became more
intuitive and the analytical capacity more sophisticated, the black boxes
might steadily climb up the bureaucratic ladder, displacing supervisors,
division heads, and even agency administrators. All of which could recast—
or even disrupt—legally-sanctioned bureaucratic authority.
It may seem simple enough to determine the expected value of these
changes in social welfare terms. Consider the choice, for example, to
replace an administrative law judge working on disability determinations,
or even an Under Secretary responsible for food safety, with an expert
system––one that could replay in exquisite detail the sequence of decision
rules it relied on to render a judgment. Any reasonable effort to judge the
quality of that judgment mainly depends on how a statute or regulatory rule
defines a domain-specific metric of success. Because such delegation could
affect variables that cut across domains––such as perceptions of
government legitimacy, cybersecurity risks, and the extent of presidential
power––even more important would be an uncontroversial metric of social
welfare, along with certain assumptions to minimize the difficult trade-offs
across domains.
But more profound challenges would arise in the myriad situations
where the unambiguous metric is not so easily available. Think about the
subtle choices involving drug approval, asylum applications, bioethics, and
the protection of endangered species. In all of these areas, heavy reliance on
artificially intelligent systems could also make it harder for lawmakers,
courts, and the public to assess the consequences of automated agency
decision-making where the trade-offs are complex.
We may ultimately find that the choices we make about automation will
be part of a broader conflict about the role of people in an economy that
sheds a large proportion of existing job categories more quickly than
expected, even as it continues to enhance automation technologies that
humans find, like a sweet-tasting artificial strawberry dessert, occasionally
more satisfying than the “natural” alternative. As these questions become
more familiar, the administrative state will continue confronting a host of
challenges entirely recognizable to Weber––from striking the right balance
between agency insulation and responsiveness to the role of tradition in
bureaucratic decision-making. But increasingly, the dilemma agencies and
the public will face is what to do about the aforementioned sleek black
boxes that promise to make governing far simpler and cheaper. Whether
those boxes also give us an accurate account of who gains or loses in the
process is not something we should take for granted.
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I. THE SURPRISING USE OF AUTOMATION BY REGULATORY AGENCIES
Let us start by acknowledging that humans make mistakes. Social
psychologists, economists, political scientists, and even policymakers
routinely acknowledge the limitations of how humans tend to consider
probabilities, or otherwise weigh the consequences of particular decisions.4
Decision-makers may exhibit racial or gender biases, may over- or underweigh the importance of a particular piece of information, may naively
assume their own wisdom, or may insist on the naiveté of rivals. Even
thoughtful experts who are familiar with the subtleties of environmental,
national security, or public health data may fail to recognize patterns that
can give agencies useful ideas about how to achieve their responsibilities.
It is certainly understandable, then, why societies could become
interested in making greater use of computer systems that hold the promise
of improving the quality and integrity of administrative decisions.
Government agencies are beginning to rely more on computer programs to
make decisions, and this trend will likely accelerate. An example involving
federal regulation of pesticides highlights the subtle ways in which
computer-based analysis and legal standards could interact—as well as the
reasons why agencies may embrace new analytical techniques that heavily
rely on automation.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, which requires the
registration of pesticides before marketing in interstate or foreign
commerce.5 The current toxicity testing for pesticides depends heavily on
assessing animals’ reactions to chemicals—a technique that can be easily
criticized as costly, slow, and inhumane. At the most basic level, current
toxicity testing methods limit the number of chemicals the EPA can test,
even though it faces strong pressures to test more than 80,000 chemicals.
But further, it limits the number of toxicity pathways one can test, the levels
of biological organizations one can examine, the range of exposure
conditions one can consider, and the life stages, genders, and species one
can cover.
Given the inadequacy of current methods of toxicity research, the
National Academy of Sciences published a report in 2007 calling for a
transformative shift in toxicity and risk assessment and increased use of
computational toxicology.6 In response, the EPA is introducing many
different forms of computational methods in regulating pesticides.

4

See MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE (1st ed. 2011).
7 U.S.C. §136 et seq. (1996). See generally NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., TOXICITY TESTING
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A VISION AND A STRATEGY (2007).
6
See NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., supra note 5; Brinda Mahadevan et al., Genetic Toxicology
in the 21st Century: Reflections and Future Directions, NAT’L CTR FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY
INFO. (Apr. 28, 2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3160238/; Robert
J. Kavlock et al., Computational Toxicology—A State of the Science Mini Review, 103
TOXICOLOGICAL SCIS. 14 (2008).
5
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Computation is also helping the EPA better calculate and predict
environmental exposure to chemicals. Modern computational methods can
build complex models that consider many variables that determine the level
of exposure to toxic chemicals, such as the difference in exposure to animals
versus humans, variability in exposure to humans, and the overall
uncertainty of these predictions. 7
To support these efforts, the EPA is involved in massive data collection.
It created the Aggregated Computational Toxicology Resource, a relational
data warehouse for chemical and toxicity data from various public sources to
support data mining and modeling.8 The EPA is also poised to start using
virtual tissues; the agency is currently developing a “virtual liver” at the
EPA’s National Center for Computational Toxicology.9
The EPA’s reliance on computational toxicology underscores how
agency decisions may increasingly implicate not only human choices about
research methods, but architectural choices in the development of
algorithms and neural networks to analyze data in new ways.
Changes in disability claims, too, may emerge as agencies seek to
resolve logistical problems while compensating for inconsistencies of
human judgment. In 2013, in an effort to reduce its reliance on paper
records, to increase consistency across cases, and to automate some of its
workflow, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs launched a
computerized case management system for incoming disability claims. 10
The software reportedly automates how the Department determines the
level of different veterans’ disabilities for purposes of compensation. 11 And
importantly, it “calculates the level of disability—from zero to 100%—
solely on the vet’s symptoms from the [self-reporting] questionnaire.”12 In
essence, the software took over this responsibility for determining levels of
disability from Department “raters”—human beings charged with
determining a claimant’s entitlements.
Consider one additional example of automation, from a domain of
responsibility shared by the public and private sectors: the testing of
pharmaceutical products. As part of its review of new drug applications, the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) often considers “Population
Pharmacokinetics” models, which test how drugs will interact with different
bodies, depending on age, weight, and other factors. Traditionally, experts
7

See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (4th ed. 1997).
See Richard Judson, et al., ACToR—Aggregated Computational Toxicology Resource,
233 TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 7 (2008).
9
About the National Center for Computational Toxicology (NCCT), ENV’T. PROT. AGENCY,
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/aboutepa/about-national-center-computationaltoxicology-ncct_.html.
10
Bob Brewin, Goodbye Paper: VA Installs Automated Claims System in All Regional
Offices, NEXTGOV (June 17, 2013), https://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2013/06/
goodbye-paper-va-installs-automated-claims-system-all-regional-offices/65030/.
11
Daniel Huang, Automated System Often Unjustly Boosts Veterans’ Disability
Benefits, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/automated-systemoften-unjustly-boosts-veterans-disability-benefits-1431387826.
12
Id.
8

7
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known as “pharmacometricians” would select several hundred statistical
models (not real people) on which to test these drug interactions. As expected,
choosing which models to include was time consuming and labor intensive.13
As an alternative, the FDA recently approved a new drug application in
which models were selected by an algorithm. According to the developer’s
press release announcing the fact, such “automated model selection provides
pharmaceutical and biotech companies results in less than half the time and
at a lower cost compared to the traditional method.”14
As these several examples suggest, greater reliance on artificial
intelligence has much that will appeal to government officials. In the years
ahead, government contractors will push new technologies to sell to
administrative agencies. Outside lawyers will continue to criticize arbitrary
agency decisions. Civil society groups will make the case for more
predictable and analytically-sound administrative decisions. Taken together,
these various pressures are likely to encourage agencies to find ways of
relying on data and computer programs to make regulatory decisions.
And the promise of automation in the administrative state will not be
entirely contingent on computer systems that mimic human interaction.
Some travelers may prefer to be screened by even a fairly conventional
computer system, rather than by an agent whose biases and limitations could
color her judgment. After all, human decision-makers get things wrong.
The use of statistical and other predictive techniques by computers
could improve not only individual decisions, but systemic bureaucratic
performance as well. As computing technology improves, new possibilities
will emerge to juxtapose two seemingly opposite qualities that could make
automation more difficult to resist—the ability to analyze data and make
predictions in subtle fashion that does not easily track human intuition,
coupled with the capacity to make increasingly persuasive arguments to
defend a decision.
But what, exactly, could more robust reliance on sophisticated
information technologies accomplish? The simplest scenario is one where
information technology duplicates what a human administrator could do, at
a lower cost. Alternatively, the right expert systems could also screen out
biases and certain heuristics that are considered, in the aggregate, to be
undesirable, such as availability and vividness heuristics.
Even more intriguingly, computer programs could make it possible for
government officials to analyze information for the purpose of predicting
outcomes or responding to potential strategic behavior in a fashion that
would be enormously difficult—if not impossible—for a human decisionmaker to approximate. Massive concentrations of data analyzed by neural
networks could generate intricate new predictions of how criminal
enterprises, for example, adjust to new anti-money laundering measures, and
13

Automated Model Selection, NUVENTRA, http://www.nuventra.com/services/darwin/.
FDA Approves First NDA Using Nuventra’s Software for Automated Population PK
Model Selection – DARWIN, NUVENTRA (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.nuventra.com/fdadarwin-population-pk-automated-model-selection/.
14
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what mix of counter-measures could help neutralize new forms of
subterfuge to hide money corruptly stolen from foreign governments or
obtained through fraud. Machine learning techniques could help food safety
administrators further target scarce inspection resources to conduct the
limited number of foreign inspections that are possible given existing
resource constraints. These possibilities make it hard to ignore the
opportunities for automating certain aspects of the administrative state—
and all the more important to consider the normative questions that the uses
of automation will raise.
II. PREPARING FOR CYBERDELEGATION AND ITS RISKS
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Department
of Veterans Affairs, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration are just a
few of the agencies turning to automation as a way to improve regulatory
functioning. In the years ahead, we will see only more instances of agency
use of cyberdelegation—or the reliance on computer programs to make
government decisions. Thoughtful use of computers in administrative
government—and in particular deployment of artificial intelligence
technologies involving expert systems and deep learning—have the
potential to increase consistency in decision-making and to help agency
officials understand a complex and changing world to make better decisions.
But the advantages of cyberdelegation in the administrative state will
bring with them at least four sets of challenges warranting careful scrutiny.
First, the societal value of government reliance on computer programs will
depend on highly contestable assessments of programs’ objectives. And
deciding how to instruct computer programs on matters of broad public
concern—and telling them what to maximize—will be more difficult in
practice than in theory.
These difficulties will arise even when there is widespread societal
agreement about a given general goal, such as keeping food safe at a
reasonable cost, or reducing vulnerability to terrorist attacks, in part because
agreement at a high level of generality rarely translates into consensus on
how to implement policies through administrative agencies.
Plenty of debate will occur within agencies and among legislators about
the precise mix of goals that should animate various administrative
decisions, such as the imposition of economic sanctions. It is easy enough
to suggest that the goal is to change the behavior of the target country. But
the details matter. Often, implementing policy involves political tradeoffs
that an expert system could elide but would still be making, implicitly, by
applying a particular analytical technique.
A second challenge will be determining how much will be lost when
human cognition is replaced by machines. Our often under-theorized goals
must inform whether we should try to screen out features of human
cognition—including the often-mentioned “heuristics” and “biases”—that
diverge from conventional and easily systematized accounts of rationality.

26

THE REGULATORY REVIEW IN DEPTH

[Vol. 5:19

There is no reason to think that all heuristics and biases are bad from a social
welfare perspective. Whether a heuristic is valuable depends on what goal
one has for society.
Some features of human cognition that vary from conventional
rationality—such as the tendency to weigh more heavily the stories of
specific individuals rather than aggregate statistical information—may be
integral to qualities such as empathy, or to the ability of policymakers to
explain governmental decisions to the public. 15 Accordingly, at least in
some circumstances, quirks of human decision-making that are often treated
as “biases” to be screened out by computer algorithms may instead merit an
increasingly important place in legal decision-making as many routine
decisions are guided by algorithms.
Third, potential side effects from automation must be considered. The
incorporation of computer programs into the administrative state could
carry with them cybersecurity risks and have other adverse impacts that will
not necessarily be weighed in a calculus that may encourage reliance on
computer programs.
It may be tempting to ignore cybersecurity problems because we have
yet to develop an effective technical means for quantifying the risks. But it
would be a serious mistake to consider the benefits of automation without
considering the associated security problems.
For example, greater EPA reliance on pervasive data gathering and
computer programs to target enforcement could result in a world with less
pollution, but also one more vulnerable to cybersecurity threats that could,
at a minimum, undermine the integrity of the regulatory process and, at
worst, exploit vulnerabilities to undermine industrial infrastructure.
Cybersecurity problems should loom especially large due to the many
examples of governmental failures involving information technology. 16
Fourth, heavy reliance on computer programs may adversely affect the
extent of deliberation that occurs in the administrative state. Implicit in
democratic governance is an aspiration for dialogue and exchange of reasons
that are capable of being understood, accepted, or rejected by policymakers,
representatives of organized interests, and members of the public.
Except when computerized decisions can rely on relatively
straightforward, rule-like structures, difficulties will arise in supplying
explanations of how decisions were made that could be sufficiently
understood by policymakers and the public. 17 For example, if computer
systems determined how to allocate scarce inspection resources among
processing facilities handling the increasing proportion of the American food
15

See KELMAN, supra note 4; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF
GOVERNMENT (2013).
16
Niam Yaraghi, Doomed: Challenges and Solutions to Government IT Projects,
BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/
08/25/doomed-challenges-and-solutions-to-government-it-projects/.
17
John Markoff, Google Car Exposes Regulatory Divide on Computers as Drivers,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/ technology/nhtsa-blursthe-line-between-human-and-computer-drivers.html?_r=0.
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supply that comes from abroad, it would probably matter to importers and
consumers that these systems would be unable to yield carefully-reasoned
explanations for the choices undertaken.
Confronting these four major challenges today is important because
major path-dependent effects will make it difficult to undo the use of
algorithms once they are incorporated into legal decision-making. Path
dependence will arise because infrastructure is costly to replace and
habituates people to make decisions in a particular way.
For example, given recent advances in DNA sequencing and genetic
medicine, it is not difficult to envision an ever-greater role for expert
systems in analyzing information relevant to the approval of specialized
drugs.18 Even though computer programs and organizational expertise may
function as complements today, they may become substitutes at a later time.
Once an agency’s organizational expertise begins to erode due to greater
reliance on computerized decision systems, the agency will face steep costs
in recovering that expertise.
Overall, the administrative state is about expertise and, more
importantly, its translation and engagement with the broader public.
Administrative decision-making involves moving back and forth from
discourses surrounding expert knowledge and legal authority to
conversations that entail public deliberation and moral debate. The core
question underlying cyberdelegation will be what happens to this process of
translation when automated systems have a more prominent role in the
administrative state.
This is not to say that the status quo is any deliberative panacea. On the
contrary, it is easy to criticize the current administrative state for its lack of
opportunities to allow the public to participate in decisions. Yet the growing
reliance on automated computer programs to make sensitive decisions in the
administrative state will only complicate what little deliberation does occur.
Cyberdelegation risks diffusing responsibility between the agency’s
leadership and the team or set of machines that designed the relevant software,
raising the likelihood that decisions would be made on a basis that is different
from what could be understood or even explained by human participants.
III. DECIDING WHETHER SOFTWARE WILL EAT THE BUREAUCRACY
With widely circulating media accounts that a foreign power used
cyber-intrusions in an effort to affect a recent American national election, it
is not radical to suggest that reliance on computers to make agency
decisions is a risky enterprise. 19 But in some ways, cybersecurity problems
are just the tip of the iceberg. From cybersecurity risks to changes in public
18
Precision Medicine Initiative, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 3, 2016), https://web.
archive.org/web/20161219122430/http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/
PrecisionMedicine/default.htm.
19
Mark Mazzetti & Eric Lichtblau, C.I.A. Judgment on Russia Built on Swell of
Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/11/us/politics/ciajudgment-intelligence-russia-hacking-evidence.html.
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deliberation, government agencies’ use of automation and artificial
intelligence will pose numerous challenges for the administrative state.
Although no simple compass or rubric exists to decide precisely how to
navigate these uncharted waters, the following ideas offer a few possibilities
for how agencies, policymakers, and the courts could help increase society’s
capacity to make informed choices about the use of automation in the
administrative state.
First, it may be worth exploring how we may better police the extent of
human decision-maker engagement with automated expert systems. Until
now, the courts have been reluctant to probe the actual decision-making of
administrative leaders under the so-called presumption of regularity that
emerged over time following Morgan v. United States.20 In rejecting a
challenge to an order by the Secretary of Agriculture fixing maximum rates
to be charged by market agencies at the Kansas City Stockyards, the
Supreme Court in Morgan declined to allow an intrusive analysis of the
Secretary’s actual decision-making process and considerations. “It was not
the function of the court to probe the mental processes of the secretary in
reaching his conclusions,” the Court concluded, “if he gave the hearing
which the law required.”21 With courts loath to stray from this presumption
of regularity over the decades, it has persisted—and with it, courts’
unwillingness to police exactly by whom a decision is taken.22
As reliance on information technology increases, courts and
policymakers should consider taking more seriously requiring
accountability to be lodged in specific decision-makers. Perhaps it is time
to consider recalibrating the “presumption of regularity”—to ensure that
agency officials have clearly recognized the risks of relying on automated
analytical techniques that are too complex or opaque for officials
themselves to understand entirely.
As a practical matter, this approach raises difficult further questions
about the scope of discovery in suits to review administrative action, but
perhaps those questions are worth facing, given the risk that decisionmakers will rely on algorithms they do not fully understand.
Second, on a related note, arbitrary and capricious review may prove
most meaningful if it encompasses whether there is consistency between
substantive explanations offered in, say, justifications for rulemaking and
the analytical techniques actually used to make decisions. It is one thing to
justify a program to freeze assets associated with organizations that meet a
specific, statutorily grounded threshold of suspicion; it is quite another to
deploy algorithms that entirely redefine that threshold, dynamically, in
response to new information. Attention to cybersecurity risks may also fit
within the context of arbitrary and capricious review.
Third, agencies must accelerate efforts to engage scholars, civil society,
and other stakeholders in increasing our understanding of how to harness the
20

Morgan, 304 U.S. at 1.
Id.
22
Postal Service v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1 (2001).
21
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analytical capacity of automated computer systems without eroding our
sense of how decisions are made. As part of this process, agencies should
consider engaging in medium-to-long-term planning about how they would
address the use of automation within the rulemaking process. The U.S. Food
and Drug Administration could further investigate how trends in artificial
intelligence could change the agency’s use of outside experts in the drug
approval process. Officials at the U.S. Department of Labor may face
unexpected challenges arising from labor market changes driven by
automation. Virtually all agencies will benefit from explicitly experimenting
with different models of decision-making that aim to leverage artificial
intelligence technologies while keeping humans in the loop.
These efforts will matter because, increasingly, agencies and entire
governments will face the challenge of how to instruct complex machines that
will work across domains and agency jurisdiction, aggregate data, and guide
human decisions. Government agencies seem to face trouble even when
updating conventional information technology infrastructure, so the ability to
integrate artificial intelligence into administrative tasks may seem far-fetched.23
Yet ironically, such weakness could strengthen the case for using
systems that adapt and learn. Such systems may prove crucial to reducing
the gap between a machine’s capacity and that of a person familiar with an
agency’s culture and organizational routines. As a general matter, as
computer systems that perform administrative tasks become adaptive and
capable of modifying themselves, the more they are likely to avoid the
problems of efficacy and cost that sometimes plague government
information technology projects.
But as software becomes more analytically sophisticated, and in
particular, more adaptive to the point of being able to rewrite much of its
own code, it will be more difficult to predict longer-term consequences
ranging from subtle changes in function to unexpected rapid growth of
analytical capacity. As machines become more capable of optimizing to
achieve the goals we articulate, higher stakes attach to how we articulate
those goals and the trade-offs we allow. Crucial to our ability to navigate
these dilemmas will be a cadre of lawyers and policymakers who understand
artificial intelligence, its possibilities and limits, and particularly its
capacity to adapt in unexpected ways.
Lawyers and policymakers will almost certainly need to adjust their
approaches to using automation in the administrative state, since different
scenarios involving automation are possible, and some will prove far more
difficult to manage than others. What makes little sense is to ignore the
dilemmas that society will confront as the administrative state comes
increasingly to rely on automated systems. Nor is it justified to assume that
human decision-making is so fundamentally flawed that it must be tamed
by computer system.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-696T, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY:
FEDERAL AGENCIES NEED TO ADDRESS AGING LEGACY SYSTEMS (2016) (testimony of
David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues).
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At its core, the administrative state is about reconciling calculations of
social welfare with procedural constraints. It is an enterprise that pivots in
subtle and profound ways on human institutions, assumptions, and
aspirations—however imperfectly fulfilled—for deliberation.
An alternative that promises to make the regulatory process eminently
more tractable, technically precise, and less messy by leaning on algorithms
and neural networks will likely remain alluring because collective human
decisions are as messy and imperfect as human societies are themselves.
The biggest risk associated with automation is to assume that most of what
concerns the administrative state can be made simpler, more predictable,
cheaper, and more effective without any trade-offs. Whether that
perspective originates from a deep-seated view that governing is simple or
from the seemingly anodyne choices made by a software engineer deciding
how to visually present the results of a complex deep learning algorithm,
the problem with that perspective is eliding precisely the sort of deliberation
about the nature of social welfare that justifies the administrative state in
the first place.

